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Confronting Crawford: Justice Scalia, the Judicial Method, and the Limits(?) of Originalism 
Gary Lawson* 
84 U. CHI. L. REV. – (2017) (forthcoming) 
 
Abstract 
 
 Crawford v. Washington, which revamped (and even revolutionized) interpretation and 
application of the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause, just might be Justice Scalia’s most 
important majority opinion, for three reasons.  First, its impact on the criminal justice system 
has been immense, and even if the case is overruled in the near future, as seems quite possible, 
that effect will still likely exceed the concrete impact of any other opinion that he wrote.  Second, 
and more importantly, Crawford emphasizes the trite but crucial point that methodology matters.  
Crawford has generally been a boon to criminal defendants and a bane to prosecutors.  When 
Justice Scalia was appointed to the Court in 1986, a very crude version of the “attitudinal 
model” dominated both academic and popular views about how Supreme Court justices were 
likely to decide cases.  Almost everyone expected Justice Scalia to be a Warren Burger clone 
who would reflexively vote to lock up guilty criminals.  When he instead decided some cases 
based on meaning and methodology rather than results, the legal community had difficulty 
processing the point.  If that seems strange to modern eyes, so that a 2004 decision such as 
Crawford does not appear inexplicable, it is at least partly because of Justice Scalia’s influence 
in the ensuing decades, which has helped moved methodology to the forefront of jurisprudence.  
Third, Crawford is an outstanding exemplar of Justice Scalia’s originalist methodology in both 
action and inaction.  Actively, the textual, structural, historical, and purposive moves in 
Crawford exemplify the “fair reading” interpretative methodology that Justice Scalia spent 
much of his life advancing.  On the other hand, that methodology was applied to the “wrong” 
text, because Crawford (and all subsequent Confrontation Clause cases) involved state rather 
than federal prosecutions, to which the Sixth Amendment literally does not apply unless the most 
dramatic form of text-for-text incorporation is the correct original meaning of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  Crawford thus focuses attention on how originalism as a method of interpretation 
does not always easily translate into originalism as a form of adjudication. 
 
 
If you conduct an on-line search for something like “Justice Scalia’s most important 
opinions” or “Justice Scalia’s most influential opinions,” you will (or at least I did) almost 
always end up with a list that is top-heavy with dissents.  That is not surprising.  Dissenting 
opinions gave Justice Scalia the most freedom to exercise his considerable skills as a writer and 
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were therefore more likely to produce memorable one-liners.  They were also the best occasions 
for him to express his views candidly and forcefully and thus served as the best vehicles for 
elaboration of his broad jurisprudential and doctrinal positions.  Majority opinions need four 
other justices to sign on, and while finding four justices to share Justice Scalia’s outlook was a 
dream to some,1 the Court in his time never even approached that ideal.  Indeed, the only 
majority opinion that seems to pop up with any consistency in these “best of” lists is District of 
Columbia v. Heller.2 
Without in any way downplaying the significance of Heller, I want to offer another 
candidate for the title of “most important majority opinion” authored by Justice Scalia that I 
think tops Heller, and all of his other majority opinions, across virtually all relevant dimensions 
of importance: Crawford v. Washington.3  Crawford did not make headlines on the nightly news 
when it was decided (or at least I don’t recall them).  I doubt whether many interest groups have 
Crawford on their list of cases about which to quiz or evaluate nominees for the Supreme Court; 
it certainly does not seem to have been on anyone’s agenda during the confirmation hearings for 
Justice Scalia’s successor, Neil Gorsuch.  Perhaps it should have been, because Crawford  is 
among the most important constitutional cases in modern times. 
                                                          
*  Philip S. Beck Professor, Boston University School of Law.  I am grateful to Tracey Maclin for very helpful 
comments. 
 
1   “A nightmare to others!”  Merlin, Excalibur (Warner Bros. 1981). 
 
2   554 U.S. 570 (2008).  For a typical example from the popular press that compactly combines both points that I 
just made, see the Washington Post story just after Justice Scalia’s death: “Justice Scalia was far better known for 
fiery dissents than for landmark majority opinions. One exception was the court’s groundbreaking 2008 decision in 
District of Columbia v. Heller.”  https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/supreme-court-justice-antonin-scalia-
dies-at-79/2016/02/13/effe8184-a62f-11e3-a5fa-55f0c77bf39c_story.html?utm_term=.57c4ca8cff81. 
 
3   541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
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Crawford set forth a new -- or, if one thinks it accurately captured original meaning, a 
very old -- methodology for determining when the use by prosecutors of out-of-court statements 
violates a criminal defendant’s right “to be confronted by the witnesses against him.”4  In the 
decades prior to Crawford, the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment was given a very 
narrow reading by the Court to prohibit only the use of out-of-court statements which both made 
it through non-constitutional hearsay law because of relatively novel or eccentric hearsay 
exceptions and were deemed by the Court to be “unreliable” to boot.  Crawford enormously 
expanded the scope of application of the Confrontation Clause to all “testimonial” out-of-court 
statements – very roughly meaning statements whose primary purpose or expectation is to 
provide evidence against a defendant -- unless there has been a prior opportunity for the 
defendant to cross-examine the declarant of the statement and the statement’s declarant is 
unavailable to testify.  This category of “testimonial” statements includes documentary 
statements made with an eye towards establishing someone’s guilt, such as laboratory reports of 
DNA results and drug analyses.  Even if state or federal law has a hearsay exception to allow in 
those reports, and it almost always does, the Confrontation Clause, as interpreted by Crawford 
and subsequent opinions,5 requires the analyst who made the statements in the report to testify or 
otherwise be subject at some point to cross-examination before those statements are admissible.6 
                                                          
4   U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 
5   See, e.g., Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009). 
 
6   There are exceptions.  The Crawford rule only applies to statements admitted as evidence of their truth, see 541 
U.S. at 59 n.9; and, as with most constitutional protections, the rights protected under Crawford can be waived or 
forfeited.  See Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353 (2008).  The “non-truth” exception is potentially quite important if it 
extends, as four justices have maintained it does, to statements that underlie or account for expert testimony.  See 
Williams v. Illinois, 567 U.S. 50, -- (2012) (plurality opinion). 
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The monumental importance of this doctrine can best be seen by its enemies, who now 
include Justices Alito, Breyer, Kennedy, and Roberts.  When faced with the application of the 
Crawford doctrine to laboratory reports, those four justices – who one would not often group 
together as a voting bloc – now seem willing to toss out the entire Crawford framework rather 
than face its consequences.7  After little more than a decade, what I am describing as Justice 
Scalia’s most important majority opinion is in real danger of ending up on the dustbin of history. 
Even if Crawford is overruled tomorrow, it will still be Justice Scalia’s most important 
majority opinion.  The enormous influence it has had on the course of criminal justice is only one 
relatively minor reason why Crawford is so fundamental.  There are at least two far more 
important reasons to focus on the decision even if it does not survive.  For one thing, it is perhaps 
the most illustrative example of Justice Scalia’s originalist methodology for constitutional 
interpretation, highlighting both the strengths and weaknesses -- and I am ultimately going to 
focus on one very big potential weakness -- of that approach.  Heller certainly does duty for that 
task as well, but Crawford might be even more powerful, partly because it led to the overruling 
of decades of prior case law but mostly because it starkly illustrates the problems of applying a 
jurisprudence of original meaning in a world shaped by non-originalist precedents.  For another, 
and I think even more crucial, thing, Crawford brings home Justice Scalia’s most enduring 
contribution to jurisprudence: the idea that methodology matters.  That might seem trite, but 
those young ‘uns who did not live through the period before Justice Scalia joined the Court may 
not appreciate how revolutionary that simple idea was to the legal community in past times.  
                                                          
7    See Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647, 684 (2011) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
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Justice Scalia was a very powerful repudiation of at least a primitive version of the “attitudinal 
model” of judicial decisionmaking, and Crawford is one of the leading exhibits for that claim. 
Part I of this brief comment explores that jurisprudential contribution by recalling just how 
strange, and even unthinkable, it seemed to many people in 1986 that someone might actually 
decide cases based on methodology rather than party politics.  Part II looks more specifically at 
the reasoning in Crawford to see how it exemplifies Justice Scalia’s constitutional methodology. 
Part III briefly discusses how those jurisprudential and methodological points meld to present some 
difficult, under-examined problems for originalist jurists. 
 
 
I. “The Way You Do the Things You Do”8 
 
 When Judge Antonin Scalia was nominated for the Supreme Court in 1986, he was 
something of an unknown quantity to many people.  As a judge on the D.C. Circuit, he had 
written primarily administrative law opinions, which do not generally make for scintillating 
reading for any but the most resolute administrative law junkies.  His scholarship as an academic 
addressed such hot-button topics as the promotion procedures for administrative law judges9 and 
the history of judicial review of decisions of the public land office.10  Unlike Robert Bork, who 
was to follow him as a nominee, Judge Scalia had a relatively thin paper trail.  The confirmation 
hearing on his nomination did not draw out his positions very much.  This hearing took place 
                                                          
8   The Temptations, The Way You Do the Things You Do, MEET THE TEMPTATIONS (Gordy 1964). 
 
9   See Antonin Scalia, The ALJ Fiasco – A Reprise, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 57 (1979).  
 
10   See Antonin Scalia, Sovereign Immunity and Nonstatutory Review of Federal Administrative Action: Some 
Conclusions from the Public-Lands Cases, 68 MICH. L. REV. 867 (1970). 
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before “Bork” became a verb, and to call it uneventful does not do justice to its degree of 
dullness.  Judge Scalia did not answer any questions about specific issues or cases.  He would 
not even (to the great consternation of Senator Arlen Specter) say flat-out whether he thought 
that Marbury v. Madison was rightly decided -- because, he insisted, someone might want to 
argue the point in the future, so why tip one’s hand?11  What to make of this enigmatic figure 
who the Senate confirmed by a 98-0 vote? 
 People knew at least two things: he was nominated by a conservative Republican 
president and he had a reputation as a conservative.  In 1986, that was enough to create at least 
one widespread expectation: Justice Scalia would vote to lock up guilty crooks.  That, after all, 
was what Republican presidents had been appointing conservative justices to do for a decade and 
a half, wasn’t it?  Isn’t that why Richard Nixon appointed William Rehnquist, Lewis Powell, and 
Harry Blackmun (who was actually quite a law-and-order judge in his early years, before he 
“grew” in office into a liberal icon)?  Isn’t that why Ronald Reagan picked Sandra Day 
O’Connor?  To get rid of the Warren Court’s coddling of criminals? 
 There was much to support this expectation.  Although a strong form of the “attitudinal 
model” of judging – the view “that justices decide cases on the basis of their personal attitudes 
about social policy and not on the basis of any genuine fidelity to law”12 – commands far from 
universal assent in the legal culture,13 a great many people expect, and in 1986 expected, 
                                                          
11   Hearings before the Committee on the Judiciary on the Nomination of Judge Antonin Scalia, to be Associate 
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, United States Senate, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 33-34, 83-86 (1986). 
 
12   Michael J. Gerhardt, Attitudes about Attitudes, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1733, 1733 (2003) (reviewing Jeffrey A. Segal 
and Harold J. Spaeth, The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model Revisited (2002)). 
 
13   While the attitudinal model would not have survived as long as it has if it did not have considerable predictive 
and explanatory power, it would be surprising if other, and perhaps more complex, models did not compete for 
attention.  For a brief survey of the array of models, see Lee Epstein, Some Thoughts on the Study of Judicial 
Behavior, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV.  2017 (2016). 
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Supreme Court justices to vote the party line in important cases.  When Justice Scalia joined the 
Court, a strict pro-prosecution stance was a widely held expectation. 
 In point of fact, I doubt whether Justice Scalia had thought very deeply about 
constitutional criminal procedure before he joined the Court.  It did not come up much on the 
D.C. Circuit, and it was far outside his scholarly wheelhouse.  Nonetheless, if he was the sort of 
judge who was inclined to vote on the basis of policy preferences, it would not have been at all 
surprising to see him slotting into Warren Burger’s predictable pro-prosecution voting pattern.  
But, of course, Justice Scalia was not inclined to vote on the basis of policy preferences.  He was 
inclined to read constitutional provisions and try to figure out what they actually mean.  Since 
many provisions in the Bill of Rights are there precisely to protect criminal suspects or 
defendants, his arrival on the Court was not uniformly good news for the prosecution. 
 The extent to which a crude form of an attitudinal model shaped public understandings of 
the Court in general and of Justice Scalia in particular during his first term is well illustrated by 
the popular reaction to a relatively obscure case called Arizona v. Hicks.14  The police had 
entered an apartment in response to a shooting apparently emanating from that unit.  No one 
doubted that warrantless entry into the unit was justified by exigent circumstances.  While in the 
unit, an officer “noticed two sets of expensive stereo components, which seemed out of place in 
the squalid and otherwise ill-appointed four-room apartment.”15  The officer moved the 
equipment in order to read the serial numbers and called in those numbers.  The stereo 
equipment had been stolen in an armed robbery, and the defendant was indicted for that crime.  
The question was whether the evidence – the serial numbers – had been obtained through an 
                                                          
14   480 U.S. 321 (1987). 
 
15   Id. at 323. 
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unconstitutional search.  Justice Scalia, writing for a 6-3 majority that included the Court’s entire 
liberal bloc, said that while the stereo equipment itself was in plain view, the serial numbers were 
not and accordingly required a “search” in order to discover them.  That search, in turn, needed 
to be supported by probable cause, rather than some lesser standard such as reasonable suspicion, 
and having the police note that the equipment looked out of place in a seedy apartment was not 
probable cause. 
Hicks was obviously guilty of the charged crime.  Without the evidence obtained from 
the search, he would go free.  “But,” wrote Justice Scalia, “there is nothing new in the realization 
that the Constitution sometimes insulates the criminality of a few in order to protect the privacy 
of us all.”16  Justices Powell, O’Connor, and Rehnquist dissented. 
 I was clerking for Justice Scalia when that case was decided.  I distinctly recall that the 
reaction of the assembled punditry was nothing short of astonishment.  “Is Justice Scalia a closet 
liberal?”17  “Is this John Paul Stevens all over again?”18  Shock and surprise came from both 
sides of the aisle.  The New York Times opened its column on the Hicks case by noting: 
“Associate Justice Antonin Scalia, confounding predictions that he would invariably side with 
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and with the police against criminal defendants, wrote an 
opinion refusing to expand police search powers in a decision issued today.”19   The Los Angeles 
Times began its report on the case by observing that Justice Scalia was writing for the Court’s 
“liberal faction” and that he had “already shown himself to be far more independently minded 
                                                          
16   Id. at 329. 
 
17   I am sure that I heard this exact phrase at some point, but I cannot (30 years later) pinpoint it. 
 
18   Ditto. 
 
19   Stuart Taylor, Opinion by Scalia Opposes Broad View of Police Power, NEW YORK TIMES, Mar. 4, 1987. 
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than expected.”20  The Washington Post chimed in with an opening line that read: “Supreme 
Court Justice Antonin Scalia surprised court observers and perhaps his conservative colleagues 
yesterday by joining with liberals and writing a decision that restricts police power to conduct 
searches.”21  Something was definitely off here.  Wasn’t he supposed to vote against guilty 
crooks?  James J. Kilpatrick, a noted conservative commentator,22 certainly thought so, and he 
complained that Justice Scalia’s opinion in Hicks was “patent nonsense”: “You may search 
Scalia's opinion in vain for one word of sympathy for the police or for the owner of the stolen 
equipment.  It would have been evident to a child of 10 that in entering Hicks' apartment, the 
police had come upon the lair of a dangerous criminal.  Were the police to seize the weapons and 
close their eyes to everything else?”23  Evidently, “sympathy for the police” was the presumed 
basis for conservative judicial decisions. 
 The point here is just to illustrate how deeply ingrained was the idea in the mid-1980s 
that to be a “conservative” justice meant simply that one would vote against guilty criminals.  It 
was not generally thought that conservative justices were supposed to apply a decisionmaking 
methodology based on abstract understandings of the Constitution and the interpretative 
enterprise, without regard to the consequences in particular cases.  Concededly, if one’s model of 
a conservative justice was Warren Burger, one could be forgiven for holding that view.  But the 
                                                          
20   David G. Savage, Scalia Joins Liberal Faction in Limiting Police Searches, LOS ANGELES TIMES, Mar. 4, 1987. 
 
21   Al Kamen, Scalia Writes Decision Limiting Police Searches, THE WASHINGTON POST, Mar. 4, 1987. 
 
22   Some of us old fogeys remember Kilpatrick as the conservative foil to liberals Nicholas Von Hoffman and Shana 
Alexander on the Sixty Minutes “point-counterpoint” segment.  Dan Aykroyd memorably parodied Kilpatrick (with 
Jane Curtin shadowing Alexander) in recurring sketches on Saturday Night Live. 
 
23   James Kilpatrick, High Court Flat-Out Cuckoo – Scalia Part of Judicial Lunacy, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Mar. 23, 
1987. 
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result of that view was that the legal commentariat had no idea how to process or handle Justice 
Scalia.  He was a creature with which they were unfamiliar. 
 Thirty years later, the confirmation process for Neil Gorsuch reveals some modest but 
notable changes in public discourse after Justice Scalia’s tenure.  Yes, interest groups continue to 
employ the crudest caricature of the attitudinal model by relentlessly emphasizing result-oriented 
side-picking,24 but more sophisticated (and/or honest) public observers now seem to recognize at 
least some relevance for methodology.  For example, an ABC News on-line fact sheet on Judge 
Gorsuch’s confirmation hearing began:  
Gorsuch, 49, is a judge on the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals in Denver.  
He was nominated by President George W. Bush in 2006 and confirmed by the 
Senate in a voice vote.  Gorsuch clerked for Judge David B. Sentelle on the 
United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit and then for Justices Byron 
White and Anthony Kennedy on the Supreme Court.  He attended Harvard Law 
and has a Ph.D. from Oxford, where he was a Marshall scholar.  In legal circles, 
he's considered a gifted writer.  Like Scalia, he's a textualist and an originalist.25  
Notice that the first substantive legal description of Justice Gorsuch in this account zeroes in on 
his methodology. I recall nothing remotely like this from any source in 1986 during Justice 
Scalia’s confirmation.  To be sure, later in the article, one gets a healthy dose of “he sided 
                                                          
24   See Matt Flegenheimer, Democrats’ Line of Attack on Gorsuch: No Friend of the Little Guy, N.Y. Times, Mar. 
13, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/13/us/politics/democrats-judge-gorsuch-confirmation-
hearing.html?_r=0. 
 
25   Audrey Taylor & Geneva Sands, Judge Neil Gorsuch, What You Need to Know about the SCOTUS Nominee, 
Mar. 20, 2017, http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/judge-neil-gorsuch-scotus-nominee/story?id=45008516 (emphasis 
added). 
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with/against,”26 but that is all that one would have seen thirty years ago. The CBS News account 
of Justice Gorsuch’s confirmation hearing reverses the order of emphasis, leading with a “he 
sided with/against” analysis but also including a prominent mention, however inaccurate it might 
be, of judicial methodology: 
Gorsuch sided with Hobby Lobby in the Obamacare contraception case and wrote 
a book about assisted suicide that indicated his pro-life views.  Before joining the 
bench, Gorsuch took few if any controversial positions as a D.C. lawyer in private 
practice or during his brief stint in the civil division of the Justice Department 
under former President George W. Bush. 
As a judge, Gorsuch has said he follows the conservative philosophy embodied by 
Scalia during Scalia’s nearly two decades on the nation’s top court, one that 
depends on strict constructionism – a firm reliance on the text of the Constitution 
for judicial interpretation.27 
NBC News, on the other hand, went full attitudinal: a lengthy article on Justice Gorsuch on the 
eve of his Senate hearing had no mention at all of methodology but focused only on the results in 
particular hot-button cases.28  It is nonetheless noteworthy that at least some public observers in 
2017 think that decisionmaking methodology is worth mentioning.  That is not something that 
people my age have grown up taking for granted. 
                                                          
26   See id. (“He sided with Christian employers and religious organizations in the Burwell v. Hobby Lobby and 
Little Sisters of the Poor cases.”). 
 
27   Who is Neil Gorsuch, Supreme Court justice nominee?, Mar. 20, 2017, http://www.cbsnews.com/news/who-is-
neil-gorsuch-supreme-court-justice-nominee/. 
 
 
28   See Ari Melber & Meredith Mandell, Who Is Judge Gorsuch?  Clues in Key Rulings, Mar. 20, 2017, 
http://www.nbcnews.com/politics/supreme-court/who-judge-gorsuch-clues-key-rulings-n735711. 
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 It is surely too much to say that Justice Scalia single-handedly put onto the map the idea 
that judges might actually apply methodologies rather than reach results.  It is not, however, too 
much to say that Justice Scalia’s presence on the Court drove much of the conversation on that 
subject since 1986 – and that without him the conversation would look very different, if it 
existed at all. 
 
II. “Can I Get a Witness?”29  
 
 Crawford v. Washington is perhaps the most dramatic illustration of Justice Scalia’s 
methodology triumphing over results.  If prosecutors cannot use evidence gained from moving 
around stereo equipment in seedy apartments, life goes on for law enforcement.  If prosecutors 
must produce laboratory analysts in court and cannot use most testimonial hearsay without an 
opportunity on the part of defendants to confront the declarants, the number of guilty criminals 
who escape justice, and the cost of convicting those who do not, is surely going to be much 
higher.  Reading the Confrontation Clause as it was read in Crawford revolutionizes the process 
of criminal justice. 
 The pre-Scalia Court had neatly avoided this problem.  For most of the country’s history, 
no avoidance tactics were really necessary, because the scope of application of the Confrontation 
Clause was minimal.  Virtually all criminal prosecutions are brought at the state level, and the 
Bill of Rights, of which the Confrontation Clause is a part, does not apply to the states of its own 
force.  And while the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified in 1868, the Confrontation Clause was 
                                                          
29   Grand Funk Railroad, Some Kind of Wonderful, ALL THE GIRLS IN THE WORLD BEWARE!!! (Capitol Records 
1974). 
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not held to be “incorporated” against the states via the Fourteenth Amendment until 1965.30  
Thus, prior to 1965, there were exactly zero opportunities for the federal courts to opine on 
Confrontation Clause issues in state criminal cases.31  And for the nearly two centuries of the 
nation’s history up to that point, there were relatively few federal criminal prosecutions of any 
kind.  Some of us grew up with the expression “don’t make a federal case out of it” as part of the 
surrounding culture.  The assumption was that a federal case was a big, rare deal, meaning that 
few  occasions to apply the Confrontation Clause would ever arise.  Moreover, “in federal 
prosecutions any out-of-court statement that might have been excluded from evidence in 
common law litigation via the Confrontation Clause could also be excluded by bringing it within 
the rule against hearsay.”32  Accordingly, there was meager federal case law involving the 
meaning of the Confrontation Clause prior to 1965. 
 The incorporation of the clause in that year, perhaps coupled with the increasing 
federalization of crime, opened the floodgates for federal court litigation involving the Sixth 
Amendment.  In 1980, after 15 years of the onslaught, the Court summarized and systematized 
its holdings up to that point in Ohio v. Roberts,33 a case that really only involved whether the 
state had made adequate efforts to locate a witness but which set forth the guiding doctrine for 
Confrontation Clause jurisprudence for a quarter century: “[W]hen a hearsay declarant is not 
present for cross-examination at trial . . . , his statement is admissible only if it bears adequate 
                                                          
30   See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965). 
 
31   See Richard D. Friedman, The Confrontation Clause Re-rooted and Transformed, 2004 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 439, 
447 (“So long as the Confrontation Clause was a limitation only on the federal judicial system, its bounds, and its 
relationship to hearsay doctrine, did not matter very much”). 
 
32   Richard D. Friedman, Confrontation: The Search for Basic Principles, 86 GEO. L.J. 1011, 1014 (1998). 
 
33   448 U.S. 56 (1980). 
 
14 
 
‘indicia of reliability.’  Reliability can be inferred without more in a case where the evidence 
falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception.  In other cases, the evidence must be excluded, at 
least absent a showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.”34  In other words: If 
evidence was admitted by virtue of a hearsay exception that the justices on the Court circa 1980 
would have learned about in law school half a century earlier, it automatically counts as 
“reliable” and its admission therefore does not violate the Confrontation Clause.  If it is admitted 
pursuant to some newfangled hearsay exception (for example, the “catch-all” exception 
represented by Federal Rule of Evidence 80735), then the Court will decide case by case whether 
the evidence is sufficiently reliable to be admitted over a Confrontation Clause exception.  In all 
instances, the clause is read to exclude unreliable or untrustworthy evidence and nothing more. 
 This approach has the considerable virtue of largely merging constitutional and non-
constitutional law regarding out-of-court statements into a single inquiry.  It also has the 
considerable virtue of leaving very few cases for the federal courts to decide, as most out-of-
court statements will be admitted, if at all, pursuant to well-established hearsay exceptions, 
leaving no additional constitutional analysis to be done.  It has the further virtue of sounding 
good as a matter of policy; who would want to admit unreliable evidence or exclude reliable 
evidence?  And it has the additional virtue, if one inclines to pro-prosecution results, of letting 
relatively few guilty crooks walk because of this particular legal technicality.  It has the decided 
vice, however, of bearing no plausible relationship to the words of the Confrontation Clause,36 
                                                          
34   Id. at 66. 
 
35   See Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990). 
 
36   See Richard D. Friedman, Crawford Surprises: Mostly Unpleasant, 20 CRIM. JUST. 36, 36 (2005) (“The doctrine 
of Ohio v. Roberts . . . had so little to do with the constitutional text, or with the history or principle behind it, that 
eventually it was bound to be discarded”). 
. 
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which neither contains nor intimates the words “reliability” or “trustworthiness” (much less 
“indicia of”), or to the clause’s context, which focused not on the reliability of evidence as such 
but on the subjection of evidence to a particular procedural mechanism. As Justice Scalia put it: 
To be sure, the Clause’s ultimate goal is to ensure reliability of evidence, but it is 
a procedural rather than a substantive guarantee.  It commands, not that evidence 
be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by testing in the 
crucible of cross-examination.  The Clause thus reflects a judgment, not only 
about the desirability of reliable evidence (a point in which there could be little 
dissent), but about how reliability can best be determined.37 
 If one looks at the Confrontation Clause’s words -- “In all criminal prosecutions, the 
accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him” – one would 
think that the blindingly obvious questions to be asked about the clause’s meaning are: Who is a 
“witness[]” and what does it mean to “confront[]” those “witnesses”?  It took the Supreme Court 
more than two centuries to ask those blindingly obvious questions.  It happened in 2004, in an 
opinion written by Justice Scalia. 
 Michael Crawford was convicted of assault for stabbing Kenneth Lee.  Crawford claimed 
self-defense, arguing that he thought that Lee was pulling a weapon on him.  Crawford’s wife, 
Sylvia, had given a tape-recorded statement to the police, with neither Crawford nor his counsel 
present for cross-examination, that at least arguably called into question whether Lee really was 
pulling a weapon when Crawford stabbed him.  Sylvia did not testify at trial because of marital 
privilege, but the government played her tape-recorded statement to the jury. 
                                                          
37   541 U.S. at 61. 
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 The recording was admissible under Washington state evidence law because, although it 
was hearsay, it was a statement against Sylvia’s penal interest under Washington’s Rule 
804(b)(3), as it flagged her as a possible accessory to a crime.  Applying Ohio v. Roberts, the 
Washington courts had previously decided that a hearsay exception for statements against penal 
interest was not “firmly rooted” unless it contained a requirement of corroboration of the 
statement,38 which Washington’s Rule 804(b)(3) at that time did not, except in limited cases that 
did not extend to Sylvia’s statements in Crawford.39  The Washington courts accordingly tried to 
decide whether Sylvia’s statements had sufficient “indicia of reliability” to satisfy the Sixth 
Amendment as construed by Roberts.  The state court of appeals said no,40 and the state supreme 
court said yes.41 
 In a sweeping opinion by Justice Scalia, the United States Supreme Court discarded the 
Roberts framework, which “allows a jury to hear evidence, untested by the adversary process, 
based on a mere judicial determination of reliability.”42  Justice Scalia wrote that “[d]ispensing 
with confrontation because testimony is obviously reliable is akin to dispensing with jury trial 
because a defendant is obviously guilty.”43  Here is where Justice Scalia’s methodology went on 
                                                          
38   State v. Parris, 98 Wash.2d 140, 147-48, 654 P.2d 77, 80-81 (1982).  The United States Supreme Court 
subsequently agreed that the exception for statements against penal interest was not “firmly rooted.”  See Lilly v. 
Virginia, 527 U.S. 116 (1999). 
 
39   At the time of the decision, Washington’s rule read: “A statement which was at the time of its making so far 
contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far tended to subject him to civil or criminal 
liability, or to render invalid a claim by him against another, that a reasonable man in his position would not have 
made the statement unless he believed it to be true. A statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability 
and offered to exculpate the accused is not admissible unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the 
trustworthiness of the statement.”  WASH. ER 804(b)(3) (1979).  The words “and offered to exculpate the accused” 
have since been deleted. 
 
40   State v. Crawford, 107 Wash. App. 1025 (Ct. App.2002). 
 
41   State v. Crawford, 147 Wash.2d. 424 (2002). 
 
42   541 U.S. at 62. 
 
43   Id. 
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full display.  Judicial decisionmaking, said Justice Scalia, is all about reading the Constitution 
and figuring out what it means.  The Confrontation Clause, said Justice Scalia, is all about who 
are “witnesses” and what it means to be “confronted with” those witnesses.  Any other inquiries 
are simply beside the point. 
 To be sure, the questions posed by the Confrontation Clause’s text are not necessarily 
easy ones.  It is not self-evident what it means to be a “witness[].”  Answering those questions 
requires an interpretative approach more sophisticated than simply reading the words and 
declaring victory. 
Linguistically, it is possible to say that “witnesses” are people who show up in court and 
testify.  If that is what the term means in the Sixth Amendment, then the clause would apply only 
to people testifying in court, not to the introduction of out-of-court statements, whether 
introduced by those “witnesses” or otherwise.  That is not a completely worthless constitutional 
provision, but it comes close.  As Justice Scalia pointed out in Crawford, it does not accomplish 
much to cross-examine a witness who is reading someone else’s out-of-court statement.44  In 
1791, it is doubtful whether very many people worried about prosecutors and judges bringing in 
witnesses at a criminal trial who would then misread other people’s testimony.  They most likely 
did worry a lot about the out-of-court testimony itself, such as ex parte affidavits, substituting for 
live testimony, either directly or indirectly through the testimony of live witnesses who are 
recounting what those affidavits contain. 
 It would also be linguistically possible to understand the term “witnesses” to mean “those 
persons whose statements are offered at trial,”45 which would make the clause applicable to all 
                                                          
 
44   See id. at 50-51. 
 
45   541 U.S. at 43. 
18 
 
out-of-court statements used in any fashion by the prosecution.  Again, that is an unlikely 
account of the Confrontation Clause; no one ever suggested that it rendered constitutionally 
irrelevant the entire body of hearsay law in criminal cases.  Surely the clause applies to some 
out-of-court statements but not to others.  Accordingly, the search was on for a linguistically 
sound understanding of the word “witnesses” that provides the most likely public meaning of the 
term in the specific context of the Sixth Amendment. 
 For that search, Justice Scalia turned to two of his favorite interpretative sources: pre-
founding history and the founding-era dictionary.  The former revealed that “the principal evil at 
which the Confrontation Clause was directed was the civil-law mode of criminal procedure, and 
particularly its use of ex parte examinations as evidence against the accused.”46 The latter 
indicates that the Confrontation Clause “applies to ‘witnesses’ against the accused -- in other 
words, those who ‘bear testimony.’  2 N. Webster, An American Dictionary of the English 
Language (1828).  ‘Testimony,’ in turn, is typically ‘[a] solemn declaration or affirmation made 
for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact.’  Ibid.  An accuser who makes a formal 
statement to government officers bears testimony in a sense that a person who makes a casual 
remark to an acquaintance does not.”47 
 A “witness[]” for purposes of the Confrontation Clause is thus someone who “bear[s] 
testimony” against a criminal defendant – or, put another way, the Confrontation Clause is 
interested only in “testimonial” statements.  The exact contours of that term “testimonial” were 
not precisely identified by the Court in Crawford, and later cases continue to leave some doubt 
                                                          
 
46   Id. at 50. 
 
47   Id. at 51. 
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about which kinds of statements are “testimonial,” and whose introduction thus makes their 
declarants constitutional “witnesses,” for purposes of Crawford.48  Justice Thomas, for example, 
has consistently had a narrower conception of the scope of the Confrontation Clause than did 
Justice Scalia.49  The details and/or resolution of those disputes about which kinds of statements 
are “testimonial” are not my topic here.  The point is only that the framework for those disputes 
that was developed in Crawford emerged from a methodology that looked, not to the policy 
consequences of the interpretation, nor to the extent to which it reduces the workload of the 
federal courts, but to the public meaning of the words of the Confrontation Clause as they would 
have been understood by a reasonable audience in 1791.  Whether or not the Crawford Court got 
that inquiry exactly right is less important than the fact that it actually tried to do so. 
Nor, as Crawford illustrates, can one approach that interpretative task through a 
straightforward, acontextual parsing of words, though the parsing of words is the necessary 
starting point.  If words were the end of the inquiry, the inherent ambiguity in the term 
“witnesses,” which can linguistically bear at least three meanings, would shut down the search 
for meaning at a dead end.  The words can only be understood in light of reasonable assumptions 
about their purpose, understanding that term “purpose” to refer, not to the subjective intentions 
of any specific person or persons, but to the very point of using words in the specific context in 
which they are found. 
 Crawford thus perfectly illustrates the interpretative approach that Justice Scalia and 
Bryan Garner described in Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts: 
                                                          
48   See, e.g., Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006); Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009); 
Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344 (2011); Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647 (2011); Williams v. Illinois, 
567 U.S. 50 (2012). 
 
49   See, e.g., Williams, 567 U.S. at – (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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The interpretive approach we endorse is that of the “fair reading”: 
determining the application of a governing text to given facts on the basis of how 
a reasonable reader, fully competent in the language, would have understood the 
text at the time it was issued.  The endeavor requires aptitude in language, sound 
judgment, the suppression of personal preferences regarding the outcome, and, 
with older texts, historical linguistic research.  It also requires an ability to 
comprehend the purpose of the text, which is a vital part of its context.  But the 
purpose is to be gathered only from the text itself, consistently with the other 
aspects of its context. This critical word context embraces not just textual purpose 
but also (1) a word’s historical associations acquired from recurrent patterns of 
past usage, and (2) a word’s immediate syntactic setting – that is, the words that 
surround it in a specific utterance.50 
If one wanted to point to a case that applies this interpretative framework to a difficult question, 
Crawford – which goes into much more detail on the original meaning of the Confrontation 
Clause than I have suggested here – is the perfect exemplar. 
 Once the Confrontation Clause is understood to apply to all “testimonial” statements, 
because those statements make the declarants “witnesses” who must be “confronted,” it is a short 
step to the proposition that statements in laboratory reports made with the understanding that 
they would likely be used as evidence in a criminal prosecution are “testimonial” statements.  
The Court, in another opinion by Justice Scalia, took that short step in 2009 in Melendez-Diaz v. 
Massachusetts.51  This is a big problem for prosecutors.  Dragging laboratory analysts into court 
                                                          
50  ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 33 (2012). 
 
51   557 U.S. 305 (2009). 
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to testify at trials is a major imposition,52 and – with no slight at all intended at laboratory 
analysts – not all laboratory analysts will make good witnesses.  Just think of Annie Dookhan. 
 This extension of Crawford to the realm of scientific evidence revealed some serious 
fault lines on the Court.   Crawford was a 7-2 decision on the reasoning, with Chief Justice 
Rehnquist and Justice O’Connor concurring in the result because the Court could have decided 
the case without overruling Roberts; and the Court’s immediately subsequent cases elaborating 
on the Crawford framework, also written by Justice Scalia, were near-unanimous.53 Melendez-
Diaz, however, was 5-4, with Justices Kennedy, Breyer, Alito, and Roberts dissenting.  The 
dissenters tried to argue that laboratory analysts were not really the kind of “witnesses” that the 
Framers had in mind for confrontation,54 but that is tough argument to sell. A person who reports 
on what a machine spat out bears testimony against a defendant just as much as does a person 
who claims to have seen the defendant sell drugs on the street.  Surely an eighteenth-century 
statute prescribing that witnesses take oaths would apply to what the dissent calls 
“unconventional” witnesses if they appeared in court.  To make the out-of-court character of the 
witness crucial resurrects the larger idea that only in-court testifiers are constitutional 
“witnesses,” which, as we saw, is a linguistically possible position but one that is hard to square 
with the history and context of the Confrontation Clause.  Perhaps recognizing this weakness, 
virtually all of the lengthy dissent in Melendez-Diaz was devoted to considerations of policy, 
                                                          
52   See Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 654 U.S. 647, 683-84 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 
53   See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813.  Justice Thomas concurred in the result in Davis, which involved 
statements made during a 9-1-1 call that everyone agreed were not “testimonial” because they were calls for help 
rather than attempts to provide evidence, but dissented from the result in the companion case of Hammon v. Indiana 
because the out-of-court statement in that case – a conversation with police in the declarant’s home  that the majority 
viewed as “testimonial” – lacked the formality or solemnity of a deposition or a custodial interrogation. 
 
54   See 557 U.S. at 330 (“the Court makes no attempt to acknowledge the real differences between laboratory 
analysts who perform scientific tests and other, more conventional witnesses”) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
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arguing that applying the Confrontation Clause to producers of scientific evidence will disrupt 
the trial process with little likely gain in accuracy.  “Guilty defendants will go free, on the most 
technical grounds, as a direct result of today's decision, adding nothing to the truth-finding 
process.”55   James J. Kilpatrick could not have put it better.  Where was Justice Scalia’s 
sympathy for the police? 
 To be sure, the dissent’s policy concern is understandable.  Before the advent of scientific 
evidence such as spectroscopic analysis and blood tests, how would one prove that a drug seized 
was cocaine or that a defendant was drunk?  One would put some police officer on the stand and 
ask them whether it looked (or tasted) like cocaine or whether the defendant looked (or smelled) 
drunk.  As the trial judge noted in Bullcoming v. New Mexico56: “when he started out in law 
practice, ‘there were no breath tests or blood tests.  They just brought in the cop, and the cop 
said, “Yeah, he was drunk.” ’ ”57  If the burden of introducing scientific evidence becomes too 
great, perhaps prosecutors will go back to the presumably less reliable (Annie Dookhan aside) 
old ways.  This concern came to the fore in Williams v. Illinois, in which the four dissenters in 
Melendez-Diaz got Justice Thomas to vote with them because the statements in that case (a DNA 
report from a private laboratory) were not formalized enough to meet Justice Thomas’s criteria 
for a testimonial statement.  As the plurality opinion put it: “If DNA profiles could not be 
introduced without calling the technicians who participated in the preparation of the profile, 
economic pressures would encourage prosecutors to forgo DNA testing and rely instead on older 
forms of evidence, such as eyewitness identification, that are less reliable.”58 
                                                          
55   Id. at 342. 
 
56   564 U.S. 647 (2011). 
 
57   Id. at 656 n.3. 
 
58   567 U.S. at --. 
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These concerns had arisen in Bullcoming, with Justice Ginsburg writing the opinion for 
the majority which included Justice Scalia.  Here the State of New Mexico did put on a live 
witness to explain a laboratory report (in this case a blood alcohol test), but the witness was not 
the person who actually wrote the statements in the report.  (Where was that person?  We do not 
know; he was “on uncompensated leave.”59)  The Court held that testimonial statements can only 
be admitted through the persons who actually made them.  The four dissenters from Melendez-
Diaz renewed their objections to applying the Confrontation Clause to statements involving 
scientific evidence.  The dissent decried the majority’s position as “a hollow formality” and a 
rejection of “the concept that reliability is a legitimate concern,” claiming that “[t]he protections 
in the Confrontation Clause . . . are designed to ensure a fair trial with reliable evidence.”60  I 
would expect that Justice Scalia would regard the charge of hollow formalism as high praise and 
a focus on reliability as the substitution of policy concerns for constitutional language.  His 
fellow “conservative” justices (with apologies to Justice Breyer) obviously had in mind quite 
different decisionmaking criteria than did Justice Scalia. 
Importantly, the dissent claimed that the Court’s abandonment of Ohio v. Roberts 
“seemed to have two underlying jurisprudential objectives.  One was to delink the intricacies of 
hearsay law from a constitutional mandate; and the other was to allow the States, in their own 
courts and legislatures and without this Court’s supervision, to explore and develop sensible, 
specific evidentiary rules . . . .”61  Shades of the attitudinal model circa 1985!  Isn’t it possible 
that Justice Scalia, in writing Crawford, had as his “jurisprudential objective[]” getting the right 
                                                          
 
59   564 U.S. at 662. 
 
60   Id. at 677, 678. 
 
61   Id. at 681. 
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interpretation of the Sixth Amendment rather than serving some policy goals?  Justice Scalia 
surely thought so.  In 2011, after Justice Scalia had been on the Court for 25 years, even his 
“conservative” colleagues did not always get it. 
 
III.  “So I Wanna Know, What’s the Name of the Game?  Does It Mean Anything to You?”62 
 
Is Crawford a triumph for originalist methodology?  The question is much more difficult 
than it seems at first glance.  The answer depends, as a former president might say, on what 
“originalist” means. 
All of the Court’s post-Crawford Confrontation Clause cases, as well as Crawford itself, 
have involved state criminal prosecutions.  That means that none of those cases, including 
Crawford, has actually implicated the text of the Confrontation Clause as a matter of original 
meaning. 
The Confrontation Clause, as with the rest of the Bill of Rights, does not apply to the 
states.  The text, if any, that limits the criminal procedures of states is section one of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, which reads: “No State shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive 
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within 
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”63  It is possible, I suppose, that this provision 
incorporates the precise text of the Confrontation Clause against the states, though that seems a 
very unlikely account of the language actually used.  It is perhaps more possible that the 
                                                          
62   Abba, The Name of the Game, ABBA: THE ALBUM (Atlantic 1977). 
 
63   U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
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Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment makes applicable to the states 
most or even all of the principles represented by the specific provisions in the Bill of Rights, 
though it is less clear whether that application extends to all violations of those principles or only 
to discriminatory violations of those principles.  Finally, it is also possible that the text of the 
Fourteenth Amendment contains its own substantive requirements independent of the Bill of 
Rights, and the extent of any overlap between those two texts is therefore entirely contingent. 
It is quite far from my task here, or anywhere else, to sort out the original meaning of 
section one of the Fourteenth Amendment.  The only point here is that the original meaning of 
that provision, rather than the original meaning of the Confrontation Clause, needs to be the real 
focus of originalist analysis if one want to know how the Constitution limits state prosecutors’ 
use of out-of-court statements.  The dissenting justices in the post-Crawford world have a point.  
Application of the Confrontation Clause, as construed (let us assume for the moment correctly) 
by Crawford, has consequences when applied to state criminal prosecutions that are 
immeasurably greater than would be the consequences of a provision applicable only to the 
federal government.  The same, of course, could be said of all of the other Bill of Rights 
provisions, from the Establishment Clause to the Takings Clause.  In short, Justice Scalia might 
be completely right about the meaning of the Confrontation Clause, and the post-Crawford 
dissenters might be completely right about the absurdity of applying that meaning to state 
proceedings if no straightforward variant of the incorporation doctrine is correct as a matter of 
original meaning. 
Of course, no Court in the foreseeable future is going to do away with the incorporation 
doctrine, even if that is the “correct” answer as a matter of original meaning.  That is a brute fact.  
Given that fact, what to do with cases such as Crawford?  Does one simply run with the original 
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meaning of the clause, even in a context in which that original meaning has no application as an 
original matter, and even when such (mis)application threatens to distort the original 
constitutional structure?  Or does one invent a new meaning for the Confrontation Clause, in a 
kind of cy pres action, which best preserves the overall plan of the document, whatever that 
might mean apart from the document’s actual text and regardless of how that new meaning feeds 
back into cases involving the federal government, to which the Confrontation Clause really does 
apply? 
This is a subspecies of a large set of second-best problems in legal theory that might well 
have no solution.  At least, I have never come up with a systematic solution to second-best 
problems, in this or any other context.64  I am hardly the only person to notice the problem,65 and 
this is not the place in which to engage in extensive discussion of such topics.  All I will say here 
is that Justice Scalia, in deciding a case such as Crawford, was not really engaged in the 
enterprise of interpretation, originalist or otherwise.  He was engaged in the enterprise of 
adjudication, which, as I detail at some length elsewhere,66 is a quite different cognitive 
operation from interpretation.  Interpretation is about ascertaining communicative meaning; 
adjudication is about resolving real-world disputes.  The relationship, both logical and empirical, 
between originalist interpretation and originalist adjudication remains an object that cries out for 
more study. 
                                                          
64   For some tentative explorations of second-best problems in connection with proof, see GARY LAWSON, 
EVIDENCE OF THE LAW: PROVING LEGAL CLAIMS 133-46 (2017). 
 
65   See, e.g., Michael Lewyn, When Scalia Wasn’t Such an Originalist, 32 TOURO L. REV. 747 (2016); Peter B. 
McCutchen, Mistakes, Precedent, and the Rise of the Administrative State: Toward a Constitutional Theory of the 
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66   See Gary Lawson, Did Justice Scalia Have a Theory of Interpretation?, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2143 (2017). 
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I have elsewhere explored how those two different enterprises played out in Justice 
Scalia’s judicial writings.67  Suffice it to say that Justice Scalia was interested primarily in 
adjudication, not interpretation.  “Virtually all of Justice Scalia’s writings have been directed 
towards articulating a theory of adjudication, not a theory of interpretation.  He was instructing 
judges, and indirectly lawyers, about how to decide cases.  Accordingly, his instructions on how 
to construe texts were not really designed to interpret those texts, in the sense of finding their 
meaning as accurately as possible, but were instead designed to provide instructions on how to 
decide cases.”68  For Justice Scalia, interpretation was the handmaiden of adjudication, and he 
generally justified his interpretative moves by reference to adjudicatory norms and goals rather 
than epistemological norms.  In Reading Law, Justice Scalia and Bryan Garner drew their 
definition of “interpretation” from a 1900 legal encyclopedia: “the ascertainment of the thought 
or meaning of the author of, or the parties to, a legal document, as expressed therein, according 
to the rules of language and subject to the rules of law.”69  Thus, “Justice Scalia was not really 
trying to set forth a methodology for interpreting texts, or even for ascertaining the meaning of 
distinctively legal texts.  He was setting forth a methodology for resolving legal disputes in 
which texts are invoked by one or the other party.  Interpretative meaning plays a role in that 
methodology, but the role is far from exclusive, and it is often decidedly secondary.”70   
                                                          
67   See id. 
 
68   Id. at 2158. 
69   H.T. Tiffany, Interpretation and Construction, in 17 AMERICAN AND ENGLISH ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW 1, 2 
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In my own work, I try to stick to interpretation rather than adjudication,71 but that is a 
story for another time. 
From within Justice Scalia’s framework, it is not at all obvious how to approach a 
problem such as Crawford, in which the “adjudicatory meaning” of the Fourteenth Amendment 
is taken to prescribe looking to the “interpretative meaning” of the Sixth Amendment and then to 
apply that interpretative meaning in adjudicatory contexts to which it might not have been suited.  
Would the Sixth Amendment have been written and ratified in its current form if, in 1791, it was 
intended to apply to states as well as to the federal government?  The world may never know. 
Crawford was, I think, a genuine triumph of originalist interpretation.  Whether it was a 
triumph of originalist adjudication depends on the answers to some very important questions that 
cannot be derived from originalism as a theory of interpretation but that can come only from a 
normative theory of judging – and indeed from a normative theory that prescribes how to 
navigate the world of second-best.  Put crudely: If one is trying to decide cases in accordance 
with the original meaning of the Constitution, and not just the original meaning of one small part 
of that document taken out of context, maybe Michael Crawford, and James Hicks for that 
matter, really belonged in jail. 
As is so often the case, Justice Scalia’s writings present us with issues in an unusually 
clear and stark fashion, even if they do not always lead us straight to the answers. 
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